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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

KAMP v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES: A
PRESUMED PARENT, WHO ASSERTS A PATERNITY
DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A POST -DIVORCE
PROCEEDING, MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT PATERNITY
TESTING IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.
By: Brittany King

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the best interest of the
child analysis is required when a presumed parent seeks to
renounce paternity, even if the child knows that the parent is not her
biological father. Kamp v. Dep't of Human Servs., 410 Md. 645, 980
A.2d 448 (2009). Additionally, a presumed parent may be estopped
from asserting a paternity claim after previously and continuously
acknowledging the child as his own. Id. at 678, 980 A.2d 468.
Ms. Duckworth ("Duckworth") and Mr. Kamp ("Kamp") were
married from September, 1983 until April, 1999. During the marriage,
Duckworth conceived three children with Kamp. In June, 1987, Kamp
had a vasectomy, preventing Kamp from fathering any more children.
While Kamp was away on business in early 1992, Duckworth had an
affair with Mr. James Stanton ("Stanton"), resulting in the birth of
Julie Kamp ("Julie") on December 10, 1992. Nevertheless, prior to
Julie's birth, Duckworth and Kamp agreed to raise her as a child of the
marriage.
Kamp continued to acknowledge Julie as his child following the
couple's separation and subsequent divorce. A Voluntary Separation
Agreement executed on December 15, 1998, identified Julie as one of
four children born of the marriage. Further, Julie lived with Kamp for
about a year in 2001. During this time, when Julie was eight years
old, she discovered that Stanton, and not Kamp, was her biological
father.
Kamp continuously acknowledged Julie as his child, even after she
discovered that Kamp was not her biological father. In February of
2002, Kamp counter-petitioned for custody, visitation, and child
support for the minor children of the marriage, including Julie. Kamp
further acknowledged his financial responsibilities for Julie, and his
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other minor child, in February of 2003, in a Memorandum of
Understanding.
Duckworth moved to modify child support on July 28, 2005.
Kamp's answer to the motion to modify child support was the first
time that he asserted the paternity defense and his first request for
DNA testing. In granting Kamp's request, the Circuit Court for
Garrett County focused exclusively on the fact that Julie knew Kamp
was not her biological father and that Julie's parents had since
divorced. Despite the presiding Master's recommendations, the court
sustained Kamp's exceptions and ordered DNA testing. Upon
confirming that Julie was not Kamp's biological child, the trial court
granted Kamp' s requests to terminate his child support and declare all
arrearages uncollectible.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded
the case to the circuit court, finding that the trial court abused its
discretion by granting Kamp's request for DNA testing. The court
reasoned that the trial court failed to consider whether the testing was
in Julie's best interest. In particular, the trial court failed to evaluate
the emotional harm to the child. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to determine when a paternity test is appropriate if
the child in question was born into the marriage and the presumed
parent does not challenge paternity until post-divorce proceedings.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by reviewing
the provisions of the Estates and Trusts and Family Law Articles that
govern paternity disputes. Kamp, 410 Md. at 655-59, 980 A.2d at
454-57. The court recognized that, under both section 1-206(a) of the
Estates and Trusts Article and section 5-1027(c)(1) of the Family Law
Article, a presumption of paternity exists when a child is born within a
marriage. Id. at 655-56, 980 A.2d at 454 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS § 1-206(a); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1)).
To rebut this presumption, a party may request blood or genetic
testing. Id. at 658-59, 980 A.2d at 456 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW §§ 5-1027,5-1029, 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2)). The court has interpreted
section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article to require the trial court to
order DNA testing upon a party's request. Id. at 657,980 A.2d at 455
(citing Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 429, 754 A.2d 389, 407
(2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029). The Estates and Trusts
Article, however, affords the trial court the discretion to deny a request
for DNA testing if it is against the best interest of the child. Id. at 65657, 980 A.2d at 455 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206).
The court interpreted two independent lines of cases, which
encompass paternity proceedings under both the Estates and Trusts
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and Family Law Articles. Id. at 659-65, 980 A.2d at 456-60. In doing
so, the court detennined that, under both articles, a party to a marriage
seeking to disclaim paternity for the first time in a post-divorce
proceeding must meet the threshold requirement that DNA testing is in
the best interest of the child. Kamp, 410 Md. at 655,980 A.2d at 460.
Interests in protecting the family unit, and the relationships within it,
prevent a party from rashly rebutting presumed paternity. Id. at 661,
980 A.2d at 457 (quoting Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 116-17,
607 A.2d 935, 940 (1992)). Maryland case law requires greater
scrutiny of the child's best interests prior to ordering paternity testing
, where the paternity of the child is established through more than one
independent avenue. Id. at 665, 980 A.2d at 460. Therefore, the
presumption of paternity is particularly strong where the relationship
with the child is established through marriage, and the party continues
to acknowledge the child even after the dissolution of the marriage.
Id.
In keeping with Maryland's paternity case law, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland clarified the degree of discretion a trial court
enjoys for ordering DNA testing. Id. at 661, 665-72, 980 A.2d at 45758, 460-64 (citing Turner, 327 Md. at 116-17, 607 A.2d at 940).
When a party challenges the paternity of a child born within a
marriage that has since dissolved, the court should broaden its
evaluation beyond the slight interest in protecting a family unit that no
longer exists and consider the child's relationship with the presumed
parent from that marriage. Id. at 669, 980 A.2d at 462. Facts
demonstrating that the challenging party continued to acknowledge the
child as his own are particularly relevant to the analysis, even when
both the challenging party and the child know that the party is not the
child's biological father. Kamp, 410 Md. at 669-70,980 A.2d at 463.
Next, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified the application of
judicial estoppel in paternity cases of a presumed parent. Id. at 67279, 980 A.2d at 464-68. Judicial estoppel prevents a party from
misleading the court by seeking to rebut the presumption of paternity
after previously acknowledging the child as his own. Id. at 673, 980
A.2d at 465. The same factors used to detennine whether to order
DNA testing are also applied to detennine whether a party is judicially
estopped from asserting the paternity defense. Id. at 678, 980 A.2d at
468. A longstanding parental relationship, where the presumed parent
continuously acknowledged the child, invites the judicial estoppel
defense. Id. A trial court, however, should not detennine whether a
party is judicially estopped from asserting a paternity claim until after
deciding, as a preliminary matter, whether paternity testing is in the
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child's best interest. Id. at 678, 980 A.2d at 468. Therefore, the court
did not directly decide on the judicial estoppel issue and, instead,
affirmed the lower appellate court's ruling in which it remanded the
case for further proceedings to determine whether a paternity test was
in the child's best interest. Kamp, 410 Md. at 678-79, 980 A.2d at
468.
In Kamp, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reinforced Maryland's
presumption of legitimacy and paternity by explicitly rejecting the
narrow application of the best interest of the child analysis in postdivorce paternity proceedings. In doing so, the court ensured that
paternity proceedings cannot be used as a weapon to gain unfair
advantages or evade financial responsibilities in divorce and postdivorce proceedings. Maryland practitioners should be aware that the
defense of paternity, if asserted at all, must be introduced early in
litigation. Furthermore, practitioners should advise clients that a
paternity defense may not be successful for a party that is the
presumed parent of a child or has continuously acknowledged a child
as his own. Ultimately, Kamp strengthened the procedural safeguards
of paternity proceedings, which are necessary to protect children
already victimized by family break-ups and controversy.

